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ABSTRACT. Scenario analysis is a useful tool for exploring key uncertainties that may shape the future
of social-ecological systems. This paper explores the methods, costs, and benefits of developing and linking
scenarios of social-ecological systems across multiple spatial scales. Drawing largely on experiences in
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, we suggest that the desired degree of cross-scale linkage depends
on the primary aim of the scenario exercise. Loosely linked multiscale scenarios appear more appropriate
when the primary aim is to engage in exploratory dialog with stakeholders. Tightly coupled cross-scale
scenarios seem to work best when the main objective is to further our understanding of cross-scale
interactions or to assess trade-offs between scales. The main disadvantages of tightly coupled cross-scale
scenarios are that their development requires substantial time and financial resources, and that they often
suffer loss of credibility at one or more scales. The reasons for developing multiscale scenarios and the
expectations associated with doing so therefore need to be carefully evaluated when choosing the desired
degree of cross-scale linkage in a particular scenario exercise.
Key Words: multiscale scenarios; cross-scale scenarios; stakeholder engagement; Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment; environmental assessment; scenario analysis
INTRODUCTION
First used as a method for war game analysis after
World War II (Kahn and Wiener 1967, Shoemaker
1993, van der Heijden 1996), scenario analysis is
now applied in a wide variety of contexts, such as
political decision making (e.g., Galer 2004a, 
Kahane 2004), business planning (e.g., Wack 1985,
Davis 1998), and environmental management (e.g.,
Alcamo 2001, Wollenberg et al. 2000). Scenarios
are plausible stories about how the future might
unfold, constructed using qualitative and/or
quantitative models and information on current and
past conditions. Scenarios are distinguished from
other approaches to future assessment, such as
forecasting and risk assessment, by being
specifically intended for situations in which the
factors shaping the future are highly uncertain and
largely uncontrollable (Fig. 1). The aim of scenario
planning is specifically to consider a variety of
possible futures, rather than to focus on the accurate
prediction of a single outcome (Clark et al. 2001,
Bennett et al. 2003, Peterson et al. 2003b).
Scenario analysis has emerged as a particularly
useful tool for considering the linked development
trajectories of ecosystems, ecosystem management,
and human well-being, also known as social-
ecological systems (Gallopin et al. 1997, Peterson
et al. 2003b, Carpenter et al. 2005). Scenarios allow
us to envision alternative future development
pathways by taking a systems perspective and
accounting for critical uncertainties such as far-
reaching technological changes or changes in social
values. By envisioning alternative futures, scenarios
can help decision makers identify ecosystem
management policies and actions that will be robust
across a range of potential future outcomes, or that
promote desired outcomes or characteristics, such
as ecosystem resilience (Shearer 2005, Carpenter
and Folke 2006). Many scenario exercises use a
participatory process to develop the scenario
storylines. Particularly in these cases, scenario
analysis can be a powerful tool to facilitate and
increase understanding, knowledge sharing, and
communication among stakeholders, defined as
those involved in or affected by the management of
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Fig. 1. Scenario planning is most appropriate under conditions of high uncertainty and when the forces
driving that uncertainty are largely uncontrollable (figure from Peterson et al. 2003a).
the ecosystems in a particular region (Wollenberg
et al. 2000, van den Belt 2004, Lebel et al. 2005).
Scenario analysis can be an effective way of
engaging stakeholders who might otherwise be
unresponsive to scientific information presented in
more traditional forms such as scientific articles or
reports.
Scenarios have been used to consider future changes
in social-ecological systems at scales ranging from
local villages through to the entire globe (e.g., IGD
and FESSA 2002, Carpenter et al. 2005, Lebel et al.
2005, Alcamo et al. 2006). By “scale” we mean the
spatial extent of a particular scenario exercise, so
that “national scale” refers to a scenario exercise
that covers the extent of a nation. The spatial extent
of a scenario exercise is often defined to coincide
with the specific levels of social organization
involved in ecosystem management, such as local
villages or national and global entities (e.g., UNEP
2002a, Carpenter et al. 2005). An increasing number
of scenario studies can be labeled as “multiscale.”
These refer to exercises that consist of a set of linked
scenarios constructed at two or more scales.
Although most of the scenarios conducted at a single
scale engage stakeholders and consider factors
operating at multiple scales, we do not consider
these to be multiscale scenarios. In a multiscale
scenario exercise, storylines are developed at
several scales, e.g., global and national, and are
linked to one another to some degree. At one
extreme, storylines at different scales may be largely
developed independently and only loosely linked.
At the other extreme, the storylines may be
developed in a tightly coupled, iterative fashion so
that they are consistent across scales and incorporate
cross-scale feedbacks.
The motivations for developing multiscale
scenarios are to engage stakeholders and help
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understand driving forces, processes, perspectives,
and responses at multiple scales (Lebel et al. 2005).
Multiscale scenarios can better maintain relevance
across multiple decision-making scales than, for
instance, a single-scale global exercise, and thereby
potentially enhance stakeholder engagement and
use of the scenario results. The development of
multiscale scenarios may facilitate increased
communication among stakeholder groups or
decision makers at different scales and increase our
appreciation of differences in stakeholder concerns
or perspectives (Wollenberg et al. 2000).
Furthermore, social, political, economic, and
ecological processes can often be more readily
observed, or have stronger impacts, at some scales
than others (MA 2003). Multiscale scenario
exercises can highlight these differences. Cross-
scale interactions, which are important in social-
ecological systems (Wilbanks and Kates 1999,
Berkes 2002, Gunderson and Holling 2003), can
also be better considered in multiscale scenarios.
Finally, multiscale scenarios make it easier to
examine the impacts of mismatches between the
scale at which ecological processes occur and the
scale at which management occurs (Folke et al.
1998, Brown 2003).
This paper explores the methods, opportunities, and
barriers associated with developing multiscale
scenarios. We focus on scenarios that consider
complex, inter-related changes in social-ecological
systems (Berkes et al. 2003). The paper stems from
a one-month online dialog among the authors and
draws on their perspectives and experiences with
scenario development and ecosystem management.
We specifically aim to synthesize our key ideas and
intuitions about the multiscale scenario development
process, because this tacit knowledge is often not
reflected in formal scenario reports and research
papers. The authors come from diverse disciplinary
backgrounds including ecology, conservation
biology, geography, environmental science,
anthropology, and environmental economics. Many
of the authors were involved in the local, regional,
or global scenario development exercises of the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et
al. 2005, Lebel et al. 2005), which aimed to assess
the consequences of ecosystem change for human
well-being at multiple scales. We have attempted to
broaden the base for our conclusions by considering
additional scenario exercises, particularly the
limited number that include a multiscale aspect.
These include the Global Environmental Outlook
scenarios (UNEP 2002a), which have been used in
regional assessments in Africa (UNEP 2002b),
Latin America, and the Caribbean (UNEP 2003);
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
emissions scenarios (Nakišenoviš et al. 2000),
which have been used, for instance, to develop land-
use change scenarios for Europe (Schröter et al.
2006, Verbrug et al. 2006, Westhoek et al. 2006)
and climate scenarios for the UK (Hulme et al.
2002); and the MedAction scenarios that used the
European level VISIONS project scenarios
(Rotmans et al. 2000, 2005) to explore land
degradation in the Mediterranean region (Kok et al.
2006a,b).
HOW DOES SCALE INFLUENCE
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT?
Scenarios range widely in their goals, content, and
development methods (Table 1). Based on our
examination of scenario studies, it appears that the
scenario development approach adopted at a
particular scale depends primarily on the goals of
the exercise, the participants involved in the actual
scenario development, the social and political
context, and the resources available for the scenario
exercise.
Broadly speaking, scenarios may be designed
primarily for exploratory purposes or primarily for
decision support. The primary focus of exploratory
scenarios is to understand alternative development
trajectories and the impacts and interactions of the
key forces driving change. Exploratory scenarios
typically use the present or recent past as a starting
point and explore how the future may develop under
different sets of assumptions. The Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) global scenarios
(Carpenter et al. 2005) are an example of a scenario
exercise that was primarily exploratory: it sketched
out four plausible future worlds to 2050 and
analyzed the implications for ecosystem services.
Decision support scenarios are more narrowly
focused on developing or testing specific policies.
They often use the outcome of an exploratory
scenario exercise as a framework. For example, the
UK’s Foresight Programme develops several
visions of the future that are then used to identify
potential opportunities for new science and
technologies or to consider how science and
technology could address future societal challenges
(SPRU 2002). The Royal Dutch Shell group uses
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Table 1. Several major axes of variation characterize the diversity of purpose and approaches adopted in
scenario exercises. The two columns represent the ends of a continuum. Most scenario exercises lie between
these endpoints. Note that the different axes do not necessarily co-vary, i.e., the elements in each column
need not co-occur. For example, an exploratory scenario could be motivated by either scientific inquiry or
policy support (table adapted from Ducot and Lubben 1980, Bunn and Salo 1993, Wollenberg et al. 2000,
van Notten et al. 2003).
 
Dimensions along which
scenarios vary
Range of variation
Purpose Exploratory, investigate uncertainties and
drivers of change
↔ Decision support, test robustness of policies
Motivation Scientific inquiry ↔ Policy support
Focus On process: development of storylines ↔ On outcome: implications of storylines for
decision making
Inclusion of norms Normative, e.g., scenarios reflect the
desired and “good” or the undesired and
“bad”
↔ Descriptive, not based on social preferences
Approach Quantitative, “hard,” formal models:
statistical forecasting, trend-impact
analysis, cross-impact analysis
↔ Qualitative, “soft” methods: visioning, intuitive
logic, storytelling
Source of information Formal, rational, scientific observation ↔ Judgment and intuition of decision makers,
intuitive, local knowledge systems and world
views
Level of uncertainty Low ↔ High
Number of focal scales Single scale ↔ Multiple scales
Links between scales Loosely linked: perspectives, uncertainties,
and drivers from each scale partially
inform scenario exercises at other scales
↔ Tightly coupled: perspectives, uncertainties, and
drivers from each scale strongly inform the
scenario exercises at other scales
Number of storylines One ↔ Multiple (3–9, typically 3–5)
Starting point of storyline Future, uses backward inference or
“backcasting,” deductive
↔ Present, uses future inference, inductive, builds
from knowledge of roles and environmental
trends
Endpoint of storyline “Snapshot” at one future point in time ↔ Story of events linked from present to future
Driving forces Underlying (exogenous, external): hard or
impossible to control by stakeholders
↔ Proximate (endogenous, internal): controllable to
some extent by stakeholders
Dynamics Simple ↔ Complex, includes thresholds and feedbacks
Stakeholders as participants Active participants in construction and
evaluation, i.e., participatory scenarios
↔ Passive objects of analysis, i.e., expert-driven
scenarios
Stakeholders as audience No communication strategy in mind ↔ Targeted communication strategy integral to
design, e.g., policy briefings, drama, editorials
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scenarios as “wind tunnels” to explore the
robustness of long-term business strategies across
a range of plausible future business environments
(Royal Dutch Shell 2005). Decision support
scenarios can also be used in a backcasting method
to explore alternative routes by which some
desirable or agreed-upon target may be reached. For
instance, the International Food Policy Research
Institute has used a backcasting approach to explore
the requirements for achieving the Millennium
Development Goals on poverty in Ethiopia and
Zambia (Rosegrant et al. 2006).
To date, environmental scenario exercises at the
global scale have tended to be more exploratory in
nature, with a strong focus on delivering
scientifically rigorous quantitative outputs. Much
effort has been invested in the development and
parameterization of the large, complex models
needed to deliver these outputs. For example, the
purpose of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) scenarios was to provide
quantitative estimates of possible future greenhouse
gas emissions (Nakišenoviš et al. 2000) using
models such as the Integrated Model to Assess the
Greenhouse Effect or IMAGE (Alcamo et al. 1998).
Other examples of global environmental scenarios
with a quantitative focus include the World Water
Vision scenarios (Cosgrove and Rijsberman 2000),
the Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) scenarios
(UNEP 2002a), and the MA global scenarios
(Carpenter et al. 2005). Partly as a consequence of
their strong quantitative focus, global-scale
exercises have tended to be expert driven, involving
stakeholders and decision makers through extensive
review processes rather than in the actual scenario
development workshops. The stakeholders involved
usually include influential people such as
governmental officials, NGO groups, academics,
and representatives of large corporations (Evans et
al. 2006); they seldom directly include local
resource users such as farmers.
In contrast, many local-scale scenario exercises
have emphasized the process of communication and
consensus-building among stakeholders that may
accompany scenario development. For example, in
the Mae Khong Kha watershed in Thailand, conflict
exists between the upstream and downstream
communities because of stream pollution resulting
from rice paddy cultivation and high-input maize
monocultures in the upstream region (Lebel et al.
2005; P. Thongbai, D. Pipattwattanakul, P.
Preechapanya, and K. Manassrisuksi, unpublished
manuscript). A series of participatory scenario
workshops involving stakeholders representing
both the upstream and downstream communities
was instrumental in developing consensual,
community-driven policy recommendations for
resolving the conflict. The use of scenarios as a tool
to air conflicts or build consensus among diverse
stakeholders has been proposed as part of the
development of catchment management strategies
under South Africa’s new water law (Rogers et al.
2000). In such participatory exercises, the outcomes
and implications of the actual storylines are often
less important than the knowledge sharing, vision
creation, and stakeholder empowerment that occurs
in the process of developing the scenarios
(Wollenberg et al. 2000, van den Belt 2004, Lebel
et al. 2005). The diversity of stakeholders engaged
in scenario development at finer scales tends to be
greater than at larger scales (Renn et al. 1995, Lebel
et al. 2005), and stakeholders typically include
people such as government officials, private
business owners, and local resource users such as
farmers or fishers (Evans et al. 2006). These
stakeholders often have very different levels of
education, socioeconomic status, and beliefs and
values, which pose particular challenges for
communication.
The global vs. local scale differences outlined above
reflect broad trends in the scenario exercises
conducted to date. Multiple exceptions exist, and
the fact that scenarios have been done in these ways
in the past does not necessarily mean that they
should or will be conducted in this way in future.
There are a number of strongly quantitative local-
scale scenario exercises (e.g., Erasmus et al. 2002,
de Nijs et al. 2004), and some larger-scale exercises
that have focused on stakeholder participation (e.g.,
Hisschemöller and Mol 2002, van de Kerkhof and
Wieczorek 2005). The lack of a quantitative aspect
in many local-scale scenario exercises, particularly
in developing countries, may reflect resource
constraints or a lack of expertise rather than an
explicit desire to exclude quantification. Similarly,
lower levels of stakeholder involvement at larger
scales may occur because diverse participation is
more difficult or costly at these scales (Rotmans et
al. 2000, Kok et al. 2007). National- and regional-
scale scenario processes are similar to global
scenarios in terms of methods and challenges, but
enjoy a level of coherence and focus among
stakeholders similar to that found at local scales (e.
g., Bohensky et al. 2006). A number of studies have
shown that there is a mismatch between scientific
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models and policy needs (e.g., van Daalen et al.
1998), and between ordinary citizens and politicians
(e.g., MNP 2004, van den Belt 2004). Integrating
the methods that tend to characterize local- and
global-scale scenarios may partially address these
mismatches.
Several further scale-related aspects emerge from
our consideration of scenario studies at various
scales:
 
l
 Scenarios covering a wide spatial extent, such
as a continent or the globe, tend to have a
coarser grain or level of detail and cover a
longer time period into the future than those
covering a smaller extent, such as a nation or
county. For example, the MA global
scenarios ran to 2050, and many drivers and
outputs were resolved only to the level of
broad world regions such as the OECD or sub-
Saharan Africa (Carpenter et al. 2005). The
MA subglobal scenarios typically ran only to
between 2015 and 2030 and used more
detailed data (Lebel et al. 2005). One reason
that multiscale scenarios are powerful is that
such differences make it possible to
investigate different processes at different
scales or with different degrees of resolution.
It should be noted, however, that advances in
computing capabilities and high-resolution
global data sets now allow for similar
resolution in studies with widely differing
spatial extents. Furthermore, differences in
the objectives of scenario exercises, as well
as data access and technical capacity
constraints, mean that small-scale scenario
exercises may sometimes have a coarser
resolution than exercises that cover a wider
area (e.g., Biggs et al. 2004).
 
l
 The degree of control that stakeholders have
over the driving forces of change in a system
is often related to the scale of the exercise.
Important driving forces of change in local-
scale social-ecological systems are often
outside the control of the stakeholders. For
example, market access for commercial crops
is largely determined by international trade
agreements and infrastructure development
initiatives at the provincial/state or national
level. Under these circumstances, participatory
scenarios can help managers better
understand the larger-scale forces affecting
their communities. These scenarios also
improve adaptive capacity by building
understanding and trust and by anticipating
and responding to change. This approach has
been used by the Center for International
Forestry Research to improve the adaptiveness
of community forestry management in
Indonesia and Madagascar (Wollenberg et al.
2000). At the national scale, there is often a
greater degree of control over important
driving forces, which may partly explain the
success of scenario exercises at these scales
in influencing political change in particular,
for example, in South Africa (Galer 2004a,b)
and Colombia (Kahane 1998, 2004). At the
global scale, the focus shifts to driving forces
that are shaped by the most powerful nations
and/or international agreements. For example,
the degree of global political and economic
integration was a major axis of uncertainty in
both the MA and IPCC scenarios
(Nakišenoviš et al. 2000, Carpenter et al.
2005) and can be considered partly
controllable at this scale.
 
l
 The methods used to communicate with
stakeholders tend to vary between scales.
Work at finer scales, especially in developing
countries, usually takes place within
community-based or grass-roots organizations,
and the stakeholders often include people
with varying levels of education and
experience. In these cases, theatrical or other
creative visual representations are often used
to both develop and communicate scenarios
across diverse groups, for example, in the
Southern African MA scenarios (Biggs et al.
2004) and the Wisconsin northern lakes
scenarios (Peterson et al. 2003a). Although
these methods are not often used at regional
or global scales, they could possibly be very
effective at those scales. Scientists are
generally not highly skilled at communicating
to a broader public, so scenario exercises
often benefit from interdisciplinary collaboration
with actors, writers, or historians. Methods of
stakeholder engagement at broader scales
tend to center on formal dialog processes (e.
g., de Solórzano 2004), detailed presentations,
reports, and advertisements in newspapers,
and are geared toward the more specialized
and highly educated stakeholders who
operate in international and policy contexts.
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The effectiveness of these methods at finer
scales depends on literacy and education
levels as well as the ability of the scenario
developers to convey information.
LINKING BETWEEN SCALES
Formal approaches for linking scenarios across
multiple scales are not yet well developed or tested.
In this section we draw on our experience and
interpretations of the limited number of multiscale
scenario exercises conducted to date to synthesize
and suggest possible methods for linking between
scales. Our hope is that these will be further
developed and tested in future multiscale scenario
exercises.
Two features can be used to categorize and
understand types of multiscale scenarios: (1) the
number of focal scales, i.e., the number of scales at
which scenarios are developed, and (2) the
connectedness between scales, i.e., the strength of
the links between them (Zermoglio et al. 2005).
Based on this categorization, we identify three types
of scenario exercises from the case studies we
examined: (1) single-scale scenario exercises,
which are constructed at a single focal scale; (2)
loosely linked scenarios constructed at two or more
scales; and (3) cross-scale scenarios that are tightly
coupled across two or more scales (Table 2).
Based on the studies we have examined, links
between scenarios at different scales can be
established up front, maintained iteratively
throughout the exercise, or established after the
different scenarios have been developed. In the case
of tightly coupled cross-scale scenarios, links are
usually established up front and reinforced by an
iterative process of downscaling and upscaling.
Downscaling refers to the “translation” of broader-
scale scenarios to finer-scale situations, and
upscaling refers to the reverse. An iterative process
is generally necessary to incorporate feedbacks and
maintain storyline consistency. With a few notable
exceptions (e.g., Rotmans et al. 2000, 2005), most
tightly coupled multiscale scenario exercises have
been primarily top down, with greater emphasis on
downscaling than on upscaling. This is probably
because of the difficulties of incorporating diverse
and inconsistent elements from smaller scales into
the larger-scale storylines. It may also be because
of the greater emphasis of the policy-making and
research community on how top-down institutional
and economic drivers affect regions and localities,
rather than the effect of bottom-up factors.
In the case of loosely linked multiscale scenarios,
links may be established up front or after scenario
development. Linking up front is done by, for
example, downscaling global storylines to create the
boundary conditions for regional- and national-
scale scenarios. Such downscaling can be done with
varying degrees of flexibility. Quantitative scaling
is often less flexible than qualitative scaling. For
instance, the water budgets of all African nations
need to add up to the continental budget, whereas
qualitative downscaling of a storyline such as the
MA “Techno Garden” leaves much room for
defining the type and level of technological
innovation and adoption in a particular region.
When independent scenarios are developed at each
scale, usually within a common overarching
framework, and linked afterwards, this is typically
done by categorizing the drivers and outcomes in
the different scenarios and grouping similar
scenarios at different scales. This is the approach
that was adopted in the Southern African MA (Biggs
et al. 2004, Kok et al. 2007).
Links between scales in the studies examined are of
two broad types: either the process of developing
the scenarios can be connected or the elements and
outcomes of the scenarios can be linked (Zurek and
Henrichs 2007). In both cases, the link between
scenarios at different scales may be loose or tight.
Linking the processes involves a range of
approaches, from having the same team of scenario
developers create the scenarios at each scale to
running parallel processes in which scenarios are
built using the same methods. Depending on the
chosen process, consistency between the scenarios
at the various scales differs. When linking the
elements and outcomes of the scenarios is the
chosen method, various linking options, ranging
from a complete translation of focal questions,
assumptions, drivers, and outcomes across the
scales to sets of scenarios that merely address
similar broad issues at different scales, have been
used.
We have synthesized the following four methods of
linking scenario elements and outcomes from case
studies in the MA (Lebel et al. 2005) and the Global
Environmental Change and Food Systems program
(Ingram et al. 2005). Although we refer specifically
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Table 2. We define three categories of scenarios: single-scale, loosely linked multiscale, and tightly coupled
cross-scale. Each of these has specific advantages and disadvantages, and the type most suited to a particular
scenario exercise will depend on the objectives of the exercise.
Multiscale
Loosely linked Tightly coupled
(cross-scale)
Single scale
Number of focal
scales
 1 At least 2 At least 2
Consistency of
storylines across
scales
Not relevant Storylines usually differ and are
inconsistent across scales
Storylines have a high level of
consistency across scales, and
there is an explicit focus on
downscaling and/or upscaling.
Consideration of
drivers at other
scales
Exogenous drivers from
other scales included to
the extent that they are
relevant to the focal scale
Exogenous drivers and constraints from
higher and lower scales are included in a
similar way to single-scale scenarios. The
set of scenarios is usually constructed
within a common broad conceptual
framework and will incorporate similar
types of drivers at different scales.
Exogenous drivers and
constraints from higher and
lower scales are included via
downscaling and upscaling
procedures.
Consideration of
feedbacks between
scales
Not considered May or may not be considered Explicit linkages between
scales and incorporation of
feedbacks
Main advantages Simple; no distraction by
concerns at other scales
Allows stakeholders at each scale to
frame the issues that are important to
them from their specific perspective
Allows for consideration of
feedbacks between scales and
evaluation of how an issue
plays out at different scales
Main disadvantages Important feedbacks
between scales may be
missed or important
externalities at other
scales may be
overlooked.
Scenario outcomes at different scales or
different places are not directly
comparable.
Very costly; may lose
credibility because
stakeholders at, especially,
lower scales may not have
much latitude to define the
issues to be considered
Example Mont Fleur Scenarios
(Kahane 1992)
Southern African MA scenarios (Biggs et
al. 2004)
MedAction scenarios (Kok et
al. 2006a,b)
to global and regional scenarios, these methods may
be used for any set of scales:
 
l
 Driver trajectories at the global scale are used
as boundary conditions to frame developments
within the regional-scale scenarios. The
regional scenarios are developed in a way that
ensures that the outcomes of the regional
scenarios do not conflict with those of the
global scenarios. An iterative process is often
used whereby the global-scale storylines are
reassessed and reworked in response to
regional-scale outcomes. This approach may
be used to develop loosely linked multiscale
scenarios or tightly coupled cross-scale
scenarios. The MedAction scenarios (Kok et
al. 2006a,b) used an iterative approach to link
local-level degradation scenarios to scenarios
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for the Mediterranean region in a tightly
coupled cross-scale exercise (Kok et al.
2007). The Gariep Basin component of the
Southern African MA used a noniterative
loosely linked approach to translate a set of
scenario archetypes (Scholes and Biggs 2004,
Raskin et al. 2005) into basin-scale stories
(Bohensky et al. 2006).
l
 The completed global-scale storylines are
translated into regional stories. For example,
scenarios for the agricultural future of Europe
and the Netherlands (e.g., de Nijs et al. 2004,
Rounsevell et al. 2006, Westhoek et al. 2006)
have been developed in this way using the
IPCC emissions scenarios (Nakišenoviš et al.
2000) as a starting point, and then modifying
the scenarios to address region-specific
uncertainties. The Portugal MA scenarios
were similarly constructed using assumptions
and decision-making paradigms from the MA
global scenarios (Pereira et al. 2004), and the
ongoing GEO scenario effort has also adopted
this approach (Rothman 2006). In contrast to
the previous method, some of the resulting
scenario outcomes may conflict with those at
the larger scale. This approach is common in
developing loosely linked multiscale scenarios.
 
l
 Regional scenarios are developed with little
or no reference to the global scenarios and
then mapped onto the global scenarios. The
mapping may be done by classifying the
scenarios at each scale into several
archetypes, based on their drivers and
outcomes. The Southern African MA and
Caribbean Sea MA scenarios were linked in
this way to the MA global scenarios (Lebel
et al. 2005). This approach is particularly
effective if engaging stakeholders and
maintaining credibility at multiple scales is a
key focus of the scenario development
process. The disadvantage is that the scenario
storylines will contain a substantial degree of
inconsistency, and cross-scale processes and
feedbacks are not well accounted for.
 
l
 Global scenarios are used to test the viability
and effectiveness of regional policy options
without developing complete regional
scenarios. This allows exploration of, for
example, which policy options would be the
most effective or robust in alternative future
worlds.
 Scenario exercises that aim to promote dialog
between stakeholders at different scales are
particularly challenging. The logistics are complex,
and participatory scenario exercises consume
significant resources, with costs rising as the
network of stakeholders involved broadens. The
benefits are an increased appreciation of
perspectives from other scales, and a greater
consideration of cross-scale processes and trade-
offs between scales. To achieve such cross-scale
participation, one needs to consider how scenarios
at a particular scale can include stakeholders from
other scales, either as observers or participants
within the exercises themselves to help shape the
focal questions or as an audience for the outputs.
Based on our experience and the case studies
examined, we suggest that, to promote
understanding across different scales, representatives
from, for example, the global-scale scenario team
could participate in the regional- or local-level
scenario exercises, at least as observers, and local-
or regional-level representatives could participate
in the global-level exercises. Stakeholders who
function across multiple scales, such as a researcher
with a personal interest in a local area or a high-level
politician concerned about a certain village, can be
particularly useful in this role.
If the goal of the scenario exercise is to clarify the
values, needs, and wants of stakeholders at several
scales, it may be beneficial to bring the full scenario
teams from each scale together on several occasions
during the process. This would allow each team to
be exposed to and comment on the scenarios being
developed at other scales and to receive comments
from the other groups in turn. However, this can be
very challenging if there are large differences in
education levels or cultures between the different
groups. Because of differing world views that often
exist at different scales, fully coupled cross-scale
scenarios might therefore best be used only to link
scales with similar levels of understanding and
application. The GEO-4 scenarios (UNEP 2006),
designed to assess the health of the global
environment and identify and respond to developing
environmental trends, are a good example. Rather
than attempting to link global scenarios to local
village-scale scenarios, they aim only to link global-
level and regional-level, i.e., subcontinental to
continental, scenarios. Although global scientists
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and regional representatives from universities,
NGOs, and government agencies were able to find
common ground during scenario construction, local
farmers and global scientists, for example, may have
had more difficulty.
CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE DEGREE
OF LINKAGE
Deciding whether to link scenarios across scales and
choosing the appropriate degree of linkage depends
on the primary goal of the scenario exercise and the
resources available. Single-scale and multiscale
scenarios both have advantages and disadvantages.
The obvious disadvantage of single-scale scenarios
is that important drivers and constraints operating
at other scales, as well as feedbacks and alternative
perspectives from other scales, may be missed. The
advantages of single-scale scenarios are that they
may enhance stakeholder engagement at that scale
and avoid or reduce the complexity and high costs
associated with developing multiscale scenarios.
The advantage of multiscale scenarios are that they
can, at least to some extent, take account of cross-
scale feedbacks and differences in drivers and
stakeholder perspectives at different scales. Based
on our assessment of multiscale scenarios, we
suggest that, if the aim is to engage stakeholders,
loosely linked scenarios are generally more
appropriate. Loosely linked multiscale scenarios
tend to allow more freedom to explore the issues of
concern to the stakeholders at each scale. In this
case, any of the linking options identified above may
serve as a bridging mechanism between
stakeholders at different scales to understand the
impact of decisions made at one scale on other
scales. A major disadvantage of loosely linked
scenarios is that the storylines are often inconsistent
across scales and cross-scale interactions are not
well accounted for. Tightly coupled cross-scale
scenario exercises are more appropriate when the
aim is to evaluate cross-scale processes and
potential responses. We therefore suggest that
tightly coupled cross-scale scenarios are most
appropriate if the main objective is to further
scientific understanding or to inform policy making
with respect to an issue that has differential effects
at different scales or has strong cross-scale
interactions or feedbacks. Such fully coupled
scenarios can include processes and perspectives
necessary to allow an in-depth cross-scale analysis
and the development of cross-scale institutional
links. However, developing tightly coupled cross-
scale scenarios requires a very large input of time,
technical expertise, and financial resources, which
should not be underestimated.
Several further practical and conceptual challenges
should be considered when deciding on the
approach to adopt in a particular assessment.
Drawing on the limited number of multiscale
scenario exercises conducted to date, we suggest
that the following are important issues to note:
 
l
 Different goals and methods at different
scales may lead to incomparable results. 
Because scenario design is often guided by
the rule “form follows function,” a multiscale
scenario exercise faces the challenge that
scenarios at each scale often have different
functions or goals and hence use different
methods and processes. In the exercises
carried out to date, global-scale scenarios
have tended to be more science- or research-
oriented and rely heavily on quantitative
methods, whereas local-scale scenarios have
often been more stakeholder-oriented with
greater use of qualitative methods. On the one
hand, such differences in goals and methods
make multiscale scenarios powerful, in that
they broaden the perspectives adopted and the
issues addressed. On the other hand, these
differences can lead to scenario results that
are not easily integrated or compared, at least
in a stricter quantitative sense. At any scale,
it is crucial to define the goals of the scenario
exercise as clearly as possible to avoid
confusion among participants and stakeholders.
 
l
 Linking is difficult when the relevance of
issues and processes changes with scale. 
Some issues and processes are scale-specific
and lose meaning when transferred to other
scales. In many local-scale scenario
exercises, scenario developers report difficulties
with upscaling or accounting for important
local processes or issues in global-scale
scenarios (Lebel et al. 2005). For example,
local factors that contribute to collective
action, such as social capital, networks, and
knowledge, may be difficult to account for in
global scenarios. Local knowledge is also
sometimes seen as irrelevant or unreliable at
broader scales or discarded because of the
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complexities and time constraints faced in
integrating very different types of knowledge
(Erickson et al. 2005). In the case of
downscaling, certain elements of global
scenarios may become less relevant at
subglobal scales. For instance, the rapid rise
in green technology in the MA “Techno
Garden” scenario (Carpenter et al. 2005)
seems of little importance, or at least much
less important than other factors, when
considering the future of some parts of the
developing world (Bohensky et al. 2006, Kok
et al. 2007). Scenario developers or
stakeholders may be reluctant to include
processes or issues that are important at other
scales but which they feel do not directly
affect them. For example, some of the
subglobal assessments of the MA chose not
to use the MA global scenarios because they
felt that the importance of local issues
outweighed those stressed in the global
scenarios (Lebel et al. 2005, Kok et al. 2007).
 
l
 Credibility is often sacrificed at one scale or
another. Multiscale scenarios must often
sacrifice either local specificity or global
significance. Trade-offs frequently exist
between scenario credibility to users at
different scales. Large-scale studies are often
eager to use smaller-scale studies to ground-
truth or verify their findings. However,
excessive encouragement to incorporate
global issues such as climate change and
global trade regulations in local scenarios
may result in a “hi-jacking” of local-scale
scenarios with broader-scale issues and the
neglect of important local-scale concerns and
uncertainties. The outcome is often a loss of
scenario ownership and credibility by
stakeholders at the local level. The reverse is
also possible, i.e., hi-jacking global scenarios
with issues important only to certain places,
although there is less evidence of this in the
multiscale exercises conducted to date. It
may, however, play a role to the extent that
the global scenario exercises tend to be
dominated by scientists, mostly from
developed countries, owing to their greater
level of technical expertise and funding.
Those who initiate the scenario process
influence who becomes engaged and may
encourage or discourage certain groups from
participating or particular threads of
discussion from being pursued. The issues
considered most important in global
scenarios may therefore be somewhat biased
toward the interests of scientists and the
concerns of developed countries and framed
from their perspectives. For example, a
change in values and attitudes toward the
environment was a major axis of uncertainty
in both the MA and IPCC scenarios. In many
developing countries, this is seen as
substantially less important to future
environmental conditions than the ability of
governments to develop and implement
policies and regulations (Biggs et al. 2004,
Lebel et al. 2005).
IS LINKING SCENARIOS ACROSS SCALES
WORTHWHILE?
The central conclusion emerging from this dialog is
the need for future multiscale scenario exercises to
critically evaluate the reasons for linking across
scales and the expectations associated with doing
so. Multiscale environmental scenarios clearly have
significant advantages over single-scale exercises
when it comes to broadening the perspectives,
processes, and issues addressed. However, in many
cases it may not be desirable to tightly link scenarios
across scales. Inappropriate attempts to link
between scales may have unintended and
undesirable consequences, mainly by alienating
stakeholders at one or more scales. For example,
concern arose that local stakeholders in
Mozambique would react negatively to the “New
Partnership for Africa’s Development” scenario
used at the scale of the broader Southern African
region (Scholes and Biggs 2004), because it
represented a policy process in which they felt
marginalized (T. Lynam, personal communication).
This was an important reason for abandoning the
original intention of developing tightly coupled
cross-scale scenarios in this exercise (Kok et al.
2007). On the other hand, if important cross-scale
processes are at play, ignoring these can result in
the recommendation of ineffective or even
damaging responses, and an opportunity may be
missed to account for cross-scale constraints and to
develop effective cross-scale institutions. However,
it may not be possible to achieve high levels of
stakeholder ownership in tightly coupled cross-
scale exercises if they are not preceded or
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accompanied by a process that allows stakeholders
to express their concerns from their perspectives.
For multiscale scenarios dealing with the
management of social-ecological systems, the best
links in general may be loose links. Loosely linked
scenarios that share a common framework, e.g., the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), or
common focal issue, but are developed
independently at each scale based on scale-specific
stakeholder input, are typically better able to
maintain credibility and relevance to users by
retaining a greater degree of specificity. Loosely
linked multiscale scenarios still allow for some
investigation of cross-scale processes and require
more modest levels of resources and a more
manageable stakeholder engagement process than
fully linked cross-scale scenarios. Importantly,
loosely linked scenarios may help reflect and
communicate different points of view across scales.
In some cases, such an approach may even allow
convergence of issues and viewpoints to emerge
rather than forcing it, serving to enhance the
robustness of the findings and the success of the
overall exercise. Two good examples are the
multiscale Southern African MA scenarios, in
which governance was independently identified as
a major uncertainty at all scales (Biggs et al. 2004,
Kok et al. 2007), and the VISIONS project, which
developed scenarios for the European and local
scales. Although the same group of scientists
facilitated the entire VISIONS process and aimed
for consistency across scales, local scenarios were
developed independently and subsequently combined
with those at the European level to form a set of
“Integrated Visions for a Sustainable Europe”
(Rotmans et al. 2000, 2005). Loosely linked
multiscale scenarios can also facilitate the
identification of complementary or integrated
responses across scales. For example, the local
participatory scenarios of the Alternatives to Slash-
and-Burn Programme in Thailand led to storylines
similar to those constructed in broader-scale
research-driven “expert” scenarios, but the response
options identified differed markedly (P. Thongbai,
D. Pipattwattanakul, P. Preechapanya, and K.
Manassrisuksi, unpublished manuscript). Local
decision makers focused primarily on endogenous,
local-scale driving forces, whereas broader-scale
decision makers focused on drivers that were
exogenous to the communities concerned.
Integration of the outcomes of the two exercises is
likely to provide a more effective set of response
options than either exercise could do on its own.
Finally, our attempts to understand the methods that
have been used to link scenarios at different scales,
and more importantly, the reasons for choosing
specific methods, underscore the importance of
documenting these details. The written documentation
from many scenario studies focuses on the scenario
outcomes, modeling methods, and methods used to
engage stakeholders. Information on the processes
used to select particular methods, the reasons why
these methods were chosen, and how they may have
influenced the scenario outcomes is usually not
documented. Better documentation of these aspects
will enhance our ability to carry out comparative
studies and increase our potential for understanding,
developing, and testing methods of linking
scenarios across scales.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art17/responses/
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